

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 SAJ-01 SAB-01 OMB-01 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

SR-02 ORM-03 AF-10 DRC-01 INRE-00 /128 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8445

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 1658

EO 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, XF, RO, UR

SUBJECT: CEAUSESCU COMMENTS TO US LEGISLATORS ON MIDDLE EAST

1. PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE SUBJECT OF HOUR AND HALF CEAUSESCU MEET-
INT WITH SEANATOR HUGH SCOTT AND CONGRESSMAN DERWINSKI WAS MIDDLE
EAST. SOME OF THESE POINTS WERE OF INTEREST DUE TO CERTAIN EVOLUTION
IN CEAUSESCU'S LINE WHICH MAY REFLECT HIS SENSE OF SOVIET ATTITUDES
ON MIDDLE EAST GAINED FROM WARSAW PACT MEETING WHICH HAD CONCLUDED
PREVIOUS DAY.

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2. MOST INTERESTING POINT WAS CEAUSESCU'S STATEMENT THAT HE NOW

BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT THE US SHOULD CUT THE USSR INTO THE MIDDLE EAST PICTURE TO A GREATER EXTENT IF IT WANTED A SOLUTION. HE SAID THIS MIGHT SEEM STRANGE COMING FROM HIM SINCE HE HAD BEEN KNOWN AS AN OPPONENT OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS ACTING TOGETHER TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN OTHER AREAS BUT HE HAD BEEN FORCED TO REALIZE THAT THE PRACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRED THIS AND ALSO REQUIRED THE SOVIETS TO FEEL MORE INVOLVED IF A SOLUTION WERE TO BE FOUND. TO BE SURE, THE US HAD ACCESS TO BOTH SIDES, ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, AND WAS THEREFORE IN A UNIQUE POSITION BUT SOVIET FOOT-DRAGGING, HE IMPLIED, COULD PREVENT PROGRESS. ACCORDINGLY, HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE US NOT HOG THE LIMELIGHT TOO MUCH AND TRY TO CUT THE SOVIETS INTO THE ACTION. (CEAUSESCU WAS ALSO OFF HIS USUAL KEY ON MFN, WHERE HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT AN MFN BILL FOR ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE USSR - AND CHINA, HE ADDED AS AN AFTER THOUGHT - WAS MUCH PREFERABLE TO A PIECEMEAL MFN APPROACH IN ORDER NOT TO FAN "SOVIET SUSPICIONS").

3. DESPITE THE ABOVE REMARKS WHICH WERE PRIMARY, CEAUSESCU LATER REVERTED TO TYPE ON THE ROLE OF SMALLER POWERS. ASKED WHAT ROLE HE THOUGHT THE UN COULD PLAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CEAUSESCU SAID THAT NOT ONLY COULD MORE BE DONE THROUGH THE UN BUT THAT THE US AND USSR BOTH HAD TRIED TO KEEP THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION OUT OF THE UN AND TO IGNORE THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SMALLER STATES, BOTH ARAB AND NON-ARAB. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT MANY STATES BESIDES ROMANIA THOUGHT THE US AND USSR TRIED TO BE EXCLUSIVE ACTORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND RESENTED THE FACT. HE TIED THIS RESENTMENT INTO THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO AND SAID THE LATTER SHOWED THAT MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE SMALLER COUNTRIES IN THE FUTURE.

4. CEAUSESCU PRAISED BOTH SADAT AND ASSAD AND FELT THAT BOTH WERE TRYING TO REACH A REASONABLE SOLUTION. HE NOTED THAT "SOME OTHER FORCES" - PRESUMABLY IN THE ARAB WORLD AND POSSIBLY THE SOVIETS - WERE MORE INTRANSIGENT BUT THE TWO IMPORTANT ARAB COUNTRIES THAT ALONE COULD AFFECT A SOLUTION WERE EGYPT AND SYRIA. BOTH MEN WERE PROCEEDING UNDER HANDICAPS OF BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES, ESPECIALLY ASSAD, BUT BOTH WERE TRYING. UNFORTUNATELY, HE COULD NOT SAY THE SAME FOR ISRAEL WHICH WAS NOT SHOWING SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY AND GOOD WILL. CEAUSESCU SAID HE HAD MADE THESE CRITICISMS TO THE ISRAELIS DIRECTLY.

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5. IN DISCUSSING CEASE-FIRES ON THE TWO FRONTS, CEAUSESCU SAID HE BELIEVED THE AMERICANS DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION IN THE TWO SITUATIONS. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS HAD BEEN DENSELY POPULATED BEFORE THE ISRAELI TAKEOVERS. HE MENTIONED A DISPLACED POPULATION OF 800,000 FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS (SIC), IN CONTRAST TO SINAI WHICH WAS LARGELY DESERT. IT WAS EASIER FOR SADAT TO DEAL MORE DISPASSIONATELY WITH

THE OCCUPATION OF SINAI THAN FOR ASSAD TO DEAL WITH GOLAN. THE LATTER WAS NOT JUST AN OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BUT OF THE DISPLACEMENT OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE INTO THE INTERIOR OF SYRIA, THEIR RESULTING DISSATISFACTION AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF CARING FOR THEM.

6. NOT SURPRISINGLY, CEAUSESCU SAID A FINAL MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION WAS ALSO NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT SETTLING THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINAIAN STATE WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE A HOME FOR THE TWO MILLION REFUGEES BUT WOULD, IN EFFECT, CONSTITUTE A RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WITH ITS PRE-1967 BORDERS. ASKED WHAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF SUCH A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE, CEAUSESCU SAID HE ENVISAGED IT AS COMPRISING THE WEST BANK AREAS OCCUPIED IN 1967 PLUS THE GAZA STRIP. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC SEPARATION OF THE TWO AREAS WOULD BE A PROBLEM BUT ADDED THAT THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANY OTHER PRACTICAL SOLUTION THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTED. FURTHERMORE, A PALESTINIAN STATE MIGHT EVENTUALLY ENTER INTO A CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN OR, CONCEIVABLY, EVEN ISRAEL SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE. WHEN SENATOR SCOTT REMARKED THAT THIS LAST DID NOT SEEM PRESENTLY POSSIBLE, CEAUSESCU AGREED.

BARNES

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